My thoughts on “The Daughters of Yalta” by Catherine Grace Katz.

The Daughters of Yalta – The Churchills, Roosevelts and Harrimans: A story of love and war (William Collins, 2020) was written by American historian Catherine Grace Katz.  It tells of the part played behind the scenes at the Allied Powers conference at Yalta in February 1945 by Sarah Churchill, Kathleen Harriman and Anna Roosevelt Boettiger.  Their letters and observations describing the atmosphere in the Crimea and the character and mood of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, and their military chiefs, make absorbing and illuminating reading.

Katz also chronicles the fascinating and eventful lives the three women led both before and after the ten days they spent in Yalta as aides to their fathers.  Although Averell Harriman did not attend the plenary sessions, he and his daughter played key roles in setting up the conference and were there throughout.

My favourite quote from the book was that of Roosevelt’s chief of staff Admiral William Leahy concerning the Polish agreement Roosevelt and Churchill had negotiated with Stalin: “Mr. President, this is so elastic that the Russians can stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without technically breaking it.”

Stalin got, or would shortly get, everything he wanted.  Everything being control of Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe which was something Churchill opposed, but, not having Roosevelt’s backing, did not have the power to prevent.  The fact that Britain went to war in the cause of Polish freedom did not interest Roosevelt who seems to have been obsessed with setting up the United Nations, and receiving Stalin’s backing for it, above all else.

The book also notes the role played during the war by Sarah Churchill and her sister-in-law Pamela in promoting Anglo-American relations.  Churchill’s habit of welcoming US diplomats into his family home resulted in their affairs with, respectively, the American ambassador to Britain, John Gilbert Winant, and American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman. The two women doubtless did as much to foster the “special relationship” as Churchill, Eden or anyone else in the British Government of the day!

The English Democrats Party view on the war between Ukraine and Russia - and my thoughts.

 It seems the English Democrats National Council has recently voted unanimously to “oppose the giving of any further weapons of war or subsidies to Ukraine . . . as a combatant in the war with Russia”.

A recent press release concludes: “We also wish to express our disapproval of the step taken by Lithuania to block Russian access to the Russian enclave in Kaliningrad.  This is a dangerous and irresponsible step which escalates the risk of war between NATO and Russia.”

As a former member of the Party I find this attitude a little disappointing.  Although the English Democrats may have a point over Kaliningrad, Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe by land mass and could become an important and powerful military and economic ally in the future as Poland is, in a similar fashion, today.  England should be giving Ukraine all the financial and military help possible short of our armed forces active participation.

Even those who may advocate, including myself, a “fortress England” policy should realise we need friends in what is a becoming an increasingly hostile world.

Below is the full English Democrats press release re. Ukraine:

"The English Democrats National Council voted unanimously on Saturday, 25^th June to oppose the giving of any further weapons of war or subsidies to the Ukraine. 

 We oppose Boris Johnson’s and the “Conservative” Government’s programme of subsidies and weapon supplies to the Ukraine as a combatant in the war with Russia. 

 As English nationalists we are concerned about England’s and our English Nation’s interests.  To the extent that England has any interests in this war it is that it should be short and involve the least disruption to supplies of agricultural products and of oil and gas. 

 Boris Johnson is embattled at home and increasingly seeking to distract attention by involvement in the war with Russia.  His actions presents a serious threat to England’s interests. 

 We support the call from Nick Baines, the Bishop of Leeds of the Church of England that the war should be brought to a close by the concession by the Ukrainian Government of those territories which are Russian ethnic majority. 

 We also wish to state our disapproval of the step taken by Lithuania to block Russian access to the Russian enclave in Kaliningrad.  This is a dangerous and irresponsible step which escalates the risk of war between NATO and Russia."

My thoughts on Peter Hitchens' "The Phoney Victory - The World War Two Illusion".

Peter Hitchens’ The Phoney Victory – The World War Two Illusion (I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2018) is an extremely thought provoking read which argues that Great Britain did not have much of a victory in WW2.  By the end of hostilities this country was broke, the Empire unsustainable, and the Poles - for whom we went to war - were left under Soviet communist rule and were not even allowed to participate in any victory parades.

He also exposes the harsh reality of Churchill’s romantic idea of the “special relationship” with the USA.  Churchill’s flawed decision making and his manipulation of events come under scrutiny as well.

The book chapter by chapter.

Ch.1. The British Guarantee to Poland of March 1939.

Mr Hitchens argues that there were some in the British political establishment who wanted war with Germany at all costs.  He suggests that one of the reasons was to prove Britain’s standing as a “great power”, another was that “something must be done” to stop German expansion.

The British guarantee to Poland was a pretext for war with Germany, and Germany alone.  It excluded coming to Poland’s aid if attacked by Russia.

Ch.2 Plucky little Poland.

Hitchens points out that Poland was not a paragon of democratic virtue.  It was governed by a military dictatorship and was passively anti-Semitic.  Furthermore, after Czechoslovakia was occupied by Germany, parts of that stricken country were seized by Poland, with Hitler’s approval.

 Ch.3 Appeasement and Pacifism . . . or “The Left has its Cake and Eats it.”

In the late 1930s Tory Prime Ministers Baldwin and Chamberlain had begun building up the RAF and RN for defence, but the British economy could not support the spending required for a large “continental army”.  Labour and the Left opposed such defensive rearmament, but hypocritically campaigned against appeasement.

Ch. 4 The war we could not afford.

With British rearmament under way the government sought to buy armaments from the USA, but the USA refused to give any loans or credit as Britain, and indeed France, had reneged on debts owed to the USA following WW1.   Consequently, American politicians would only allow the sale of supplies and war materials on a cash and carry basis.  By January 1941, after only 16 months of war, Britain had run out of cash!

Ch.5 America First.

Of the British belief that they have with the USA some sort of “benevolent and sweet-natured ‘special relationship’”, Hitchens has this to say: “Not only is there no such thing, there is a case for saying that the USA has often singled this country out for exceptionally harsh treatment”.

Twice in the book he tells us that in 1919 Woodrow Wilson warned the British to stop imagining Americans were their cousins, or even Anglo-Saxons.

As in the twentieth century the USA became evermore economically powerful it grew increasingly resentful of British naval supremacy, and had absolutely no intention of going to war to protect or save the British Empire.  In fact, I would point out that Theodore Roosevelt once advocated seizing Canada, a British Dominion, by force.

Hitchens also notes that: “If Hitler had not voluntarily declared war on the USA after Pearl Harbour, it is far from certain that America would ever have become directly involved in the European War”.  I have heard similar comments from American historians and commentators in Ken Burns’ documentary The Roosevelts – An Intimate History, and Jeremy Isaacs’ The World at War.

Ch.6 The Invasion That Never Was.

Hitchens suggests that both Hitler and Churchill did not take an invasion of Britain seriously.  As Hitchens states: “The idea of an invasion, never a reality, suited both men at the time.  For Hitler it was a way of persuading a battered, unhappy British population to press their leaders to give in.  For Churchill, more successfully, it was a way to raise morale, production and military effectiveness by creating a constant atmosphere of tension and danger”.

Mr Hitchens informs us that as early as 12 July 1940 Jock Colville, Churchill’s private secretary, overheard Churchill in conversation with leading British generals stating that he doubted whether invasion was a serious menace, but intended to give the opposite impression.

After naval losses in the Norwegian Campaign, the Germans did not have, if they ever did, enough cruisers and destroyers to protect an invasion on a narrow front, let alone a broad front.  On 7 August 1940, before the Battle of Britain began in earnest, General Franz Halder expostulated, according to Hitchens: “I regard their (his naval counterparts) proposal as complete suicide. I might just as well put those troops that have been landed straight through a sausage machine.”

Hitchens also points to the decision taken, while the Battle of Britain was at its height, to despatch tanks and Hurricanes to the Middle East!

Ch.7  In Peril on the Sea.

This chapter is centred on the meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland.  Mr Hitchens seems unimpressed by its outcome.  Be that as it may, he ‘sails’ off all over the world to opine on Atlantic Convoys, British Mediterranean strategy, convoying supplies of British military hardware to Russia, the defence of Singapore and Malaya, and British obligations to Australia and New Zealand.

Hitchens appears to support A. J. P. Taylor (The Second World War and its Aftermath) who submits both that Britain should have abandoned the Mediterranean when Italy entered the war, and the attempt to build a strategic bomber force.  Mr Hitchens suggests that the resources saved should have been used to protect Atlantic Convoys and confront Japanese expansion in the Far East.  Such policies would have resulted in Britain not being engaged with German land forces anywhere or being able to attack Germany itself from the air.  In such circumstances I question whether there was any point in being at war with Germany at all.

Hitchens quotes A. J. P. Taylor’s opinion that in 1941 Crete was lost for the lack of three fighter squadrons.  He also points out that the defence of Singapore and Malaya would have been transformed if the 676 fighters and 446 tanks sent by Churchill to Russia in 1941 had gone there instead.  They are correct.

However, I would point out that there were even more fighter aircraft available in 1941 than Hitchens and Taylor were aware of.  From the start of 1941 hundreds of Spitfires and Hurricanes from Fighter Command were being sent almost daily on fruitless operations over northern France in an ineffective attempt to divert Luftwaffe fighter groups from The East.  In the course of that year over 462 British fighter pilots were lost – more than in the Battle of Britain.*  I suggest those pilots and aircraft would have been of very much more use in Crete, the wider Mediterranean area, and the Far East.

*Denis Richards, Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol 1, The Fight at Odds (HMSO 1953).

Ch.8 Gomorrah.

The title of this chapter was the code name for RAF Bomber Command’s attack on Hamburg in the summer of 1943.  Hitchens believes the policy of carrying out such attacks on cities was immoral and ineffective.   However, he attaches no blame to the bomber crews themselves and his verdict on their chief, Sir Arthur Harris, is very fair, as this extensive quote from the book reveals:

“Not long after Dunkirk, the language of British leaders began to take on a rather fearsome tone.  Winston Churchill speculated in a letter of 8 July 1940 to his friend and Minister of Aircraft Production, the press magnate Lord (Max) Beaverbrook, that an ‘absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland’ would help bring Hitler down.  Arthur Harris, later the chief of RAF Bomber Command, realised the significance of these extraordinary words.  Perhaps not wholly trusting politicians to defend the actions they had ordered if they later became unpopular or not respectable (as they did), he kept a copy of the letter.

Harris commendably refused a peerage in 1946 because postwar sensitivity had denied his bomber crews a campaign medal.  Harris, though an unattractive man, emerges from this with some integrity.  When a man of his sort was needed to pursue a bloody form of warfare without hesitation, he was welcomed in the councils of the great and treated with courtesy.  When, later, a startled and chastened world understood what he had actually done, he was urged to leave by the tradesmen’s entrance.  He made it very clear that he knew what was happening, and despised those who had once fawned on him and now dismissed him.  They had given him his mandate.  As far as he was concerned, they bore the ultimate responsibility.”

I would argue that Bomber Command’s campaign was far from ineffective.   Albert Speer, the Minister of Armaments and War Production, when interviewed on Jeremy Isaacs’ The World at War said that another six raids on German cities such as that carried out on Hamburg would have ended the war.  He also considered that from 1943 the bombing of Germany was, in effect, a “second front”.

Furthermore, Adam Tooze in his The Wages of Destruction – The Making and Breaking of The Nazi Economy (Penguin Books, 2007) writes of speeches made by Speer in the autumn of 1943:

“Speer reminded his audience of his triumphant address to the Sportspalast only a few months earlier, at which he had promised increases in armaments production of 15 – 20 per cent per month.  The RAF’s sustained attack on the Ruhr had put paid to that.  ‘Since the beginning of the air attacks,’ Speer explained, ‘we have it is sure, had a slow rise in production but only 3 to 5 per cent monthly.  That is absolutely insufficient’.  In fact, Speer was over-optimistic.  The monthly index of armaments showed no consistent increase whatsoever in the second half of 1943.”

Ch.9 Orderly and Humane.

This chapter deals with the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Germans from large parts of central Europe after the ‘Good War’.

My concluding thoughts.

Peter Hitchens suggests in The Phoney Victory that Britain entered World War Two at the wrong time for the wrong reason with insufficient finances and inadequate military resources, and then fought the war with a highly dubious strategy only to end bankrupt with the Empire disintegrating, and a ‘pensioner’ of the USA.  After such a devastating analysis, I find it surprising, to put it mildly, that he thinks Winston Churchill was correct in continuing the war in 1940!

"Did the RAF win World War Two?" asks the April 2018 issue of BBC History Magazine.

“Did the RAF win World War Two?” asks the front page cover title of the April 2018 issue of BBC History Magazine.  I know this month sees the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Royal Air Force and that it played a vital role in defeating Nazi Germany, but I think such a cover title is just a little bit over the top.  After all, it could be more easily argued that the war in Europe was won by the Russian Army and the US Eighth Air Force.  The Russian Army won a decisive victory at Kursk in the summer of 1943 and began its inexorable advance west.   The bombers and fighters of the Eighth Air Force achieved air superiority over Germany in the spring of 1944 allowing the destruction of German industry and the crippling of the Luftwaffe.

The BBC History Magazine editors may as well ask if the Royal Navy’s British Pacific Fleet, the most powerful fleet Britain ever sent into battle, won the war against Japan.  It achieved much, and not without sacrifice, but the American Army and Navy were well capable of dealing with the Japanese on their own.

Incidentally, another attention seeking question on the front page of the same magazine asks: “Brunel: is his genius a myth?”  What next I wonder?  Perhaps a cover title, “Winston Churchill: the Tony Blair of the 1940s?”

UPDATE 28th May 2018.
I am pleased to say I had a letter, based on the above post, published in the June edition of BBC History Magazine.  It was nicely edited and I reproduce the letter as it appeared.

Did the RAF really win the war?

How the RAF Won the War, read the title of your April cover feature.  Now, I know this year marks the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Royal Air Force, and that the RAF played a vital role in defeating the Nazis, but I thought that title was a bit over the top.  After all, it could be easily argued that the war in Europe was won by the Russian Army or the United States Army Air Forces. 

The Russian army won a decisive victory at Kursk in the summer of 1943, before beginning its inexorable advance west.   And the bombers and fighters of USAAF’s Eighth Air Force achieved daylight air superiority over Germany in the spring of 1944, ensuring the virtual absence of the Luftwaffe during the Normandy landings, and the eventual destruction of Germany’s war industries by bombing.

As for the Far East, one may as well ask if the Royal Navy’s British Pacific Fleet - the most powerful fleet Britain ever sent into battle - won the war against Japan.  It achieved much, and not without sacrifice, but I suspect the American army and navy were well capable of dealing with the Japanese forces on their own!

S.W., Somerset

Norton Manor Camp at Norton Fitzwarren in Somerset to close along with 90 other Ministry of Defence sites.

Norton Manor Camp in Norton Fitzwarren on the outskirts of Taunton in Somerset, home to 40 Commando Royal Marines, is to close along with 55 other military sites across the country.  The Secretary of State for Defence, Sir Michael Fallon, announced the closures which are in addition to 35 other closures previously announced.

Chivenor airfield and barracks in North Devonshire will also close along with more sites in Devonshire, Wiltshire and Somerset.

The loss of airfields seems a particular example of government short-sightedness as their runways make them extremely versatile and are not easily replaced.  Along with Chivenor, Hullavington in Wiltshire, Dishforth in Yorkshire and both Mildenhall and Alconbury in East Anglia are to go.

I also read in the Daily Telegraph that the Royal Navy will soon be without a shipborne ant-ship missile as the Harpoon missile will not be replaced when it is retired from service in 2018.  The Royal Navy's frigates and destroyers will then be relying on the 4.5 inch gun - 1960s style. 

Considering that the Navy's two new aircraft-carriers will have no operational aircraft for years one has to wonder what the present surface fleet is actually capable of if it has to undertake any war-like operations on its own.

This letter in the Western daily Press on November 17th is on a similar theme.

Mixed messages from the ministry.

The Defence Secretary has said that we are seeing a much more aggressive Russia and the real answer to Putin is that we should stay strong and be strong.

Hearing those words one might think that the Government was about to implement a policy of re-armament and expansion of the military. Not so, apparently, 56 more defence sites will be closed in addition to the 35 the Ministry of Defence announced previously.

Considering our Government’s actions rather than its words can Putin’s Russia really be a threat to this country?

Meanwhile, Britain has inaugurated a new naval base in Bahrain which, according to the Bahraini Ambassador to London, will be the busiest centre of operations for the Royal Navy after Portsmouth. This increase in port facilities to support any future military adventures in the Middle East is nothing but a vainglorious attempt to maintain the illusion that Britain still has “Great Power” status and a fleet to match.

S.W.

Ilminster, Somerset

Russia - ". . . the most conservative, patriotic and Christian country left in Europe." A potential friend rather than enemy?

I always look forward to Peter Hitchens’s Mail on Sunday column, the latest being particularly interesting especially his suggestion that there is more freedom of speech and thought in today’s Russia than there is in the UK.  As he points out, in Britain it is possible to be driven out of a non-political job as a result of saying something politically incorrect.  Something which as Mr Hitchens writes: “simply isn’t so in Mr Putin’s Russia, now astonishingly the most conservative, patriotic and Christian country left in Europe.”

If Russia is indeed an enemy why on earth has the British Government carried through a program of excoriating defence cuts?  The Royal Navy has aircraft carriers with no aircraft and a fleet of only 19 frigates and destroyers – hardly enough to defend the Bristol Channel.  The Army could easily be seated in Wembley Stadium with room to spare while the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight has more aircraft than any Squadron in the RAF.

In such circumstances are British guarantees of military support to the nations of Eastern Europe worth the paper they are written on?  After all, Britain has 'form' in this area.   

As Poland found out in 1939, when attacked from the west by Germany there was no direct help to come from Great Britain.  Lord Boothby, Conservative MP 1924-1958, could not have described the British Government's response more precisely when he said: "We had gone to war for the defence of Poland.  In the event we did nothing to help Poland at all.  We never lifted a finger."*  When Russia invaded Poland from the east there was no British reaction whatsoever.  Considering such a record no country east of the Rhine should count on the British Government coming to their aid in the event they are attacked by Russia.

Furthermore, Britain, as it exists today, may not be around for much longer.  Brexit has led to the possibility of Northern Ireland joining the Irish State and Scotland ending the Union of 1707 as a result of seeking a second independence referendum. 

Be that as it may, Britain’s enemies today are much more likely to be found within rather than from Northern Eurasia.  Indeed, it may come to pass that England will need to make friends with conservative, patriotic and Christian countries - like Peter Hitchens’s Russia.

Here is a link to Peter Hitchens’s article of the 7^th of August. http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2016/08/silenced-by-our-boot-faced-commissars-of-thought-crime-1.html

*The World at War, Episode 2 (Thames Television Ltd, 1973).

   

   

German domination of Europe? Be it football or European Union politics the Germans always win in the end.

England International Gary Lineker once said: “Football is a simple game. Twenty-two men chase a ball for 90 minutes and at the end the Germans always win.” 

Politics in the European Union comes across to me as being a similar “game”.  The European Council, made up of the heads of government of the 28 European Union member states, meets at a venue in Brussels around every 3 months to define the EU's general political direction and priorities. It identifies issues of concern and argues over what action should be taken.

The “game” is refereed by the European Council President and lasts for two days.  It concludes with the Germans always winning the argument and telling the other 27 member states what to do.

I actually don’t mind if Germany wants to dominate Europe or if the countries making up the EU want to be marshalled by Germany.  England might even be ruled more efficiently if the Germans were organising things rather than the present British political establishment which seems to be running our country for the benefit of the global financial elite*.

Be that as it may, as a “Little Englander” I would rather see England as an independent country minding its own business outside both the EU and UK.   Let Germany and its followers in Europe navigate their own future.

Charles De Gaulle was right over fifty years ago when he said: “England is in effect insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her markets, her exchanges, her supply lines to often the most diverse and distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities and only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her doings very marked and very original habits and traditions.”  Those words ring just as true today as they did in 1963.

This from 23rd June 2014 by Peter Hitchens on his Daily Mail Blog is on a similar theme.

Some Thoughts on German Domination of the European Union

I admire many aspects of German society and think it is, on the whole and in many particulars, a better-run country than Britain. Increasingly, I wish that Britain had stayed out of the 1914 war, and that this had resulted in a quick German victory over France in 1914, which would in turn have led to a sustainable settlement between the Russian and German Empires in the east, and the survival of both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, whose collapse has caused so much misery and continues to do so to this day.

What’s more, I have absolutely no objection to living next-door to a German-dominated Europe, provided that Britain is not required to belong to such an arrangement. And I have never been able to see why Britain should be so required. A German-dominated Europe looks landward and to the east, would always be balanced by Russia (and these days by China, whose influence in Europe is growing very fast). A maritime Britain would need have no conflict with such a continental system.

I agree with much of what he says especially with regard to a German-dominated Europe.

*London City Airport, a valuable piece of English infrastructure, has been sold to Canadian and Kuwaiti interests.
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35666988

Compare Chinese restraint in the Spratly Islands with Turkey's reckless action over the Syrian border.

Early in December two United States B52 bombers flew over, or close to, Chinese territory in the Spratly Islands, a disputed group of islands in the South China Sea where there may be significant oil and gas reserves.

Some reports suggest the B52s may have strayed off-course due to navigational error or bad weather.  Nevertheless, the  Chinese were obviously annoyed by their presence and claimed the Americans were deliberately raising tensions by such overflights.  They put their military on high alert during the "provocation" and warned the Americans to leave, but took no further action.

Only weeks earlier a Russian bomber was shot down by Turkish fighter jets because it apparently spent just 12 seconds in Turkish airspace.  Two Russian servicemen were killed as result of this incident, one being machine gunned as he parachuted from his burning aircraft.  Since 9/11 all nations can be expected to defend their airspace vigorously and no-one should doubt the capabilities of the Turkish military. Be that as it may, the Russian SU24 was destroyed for the flimsiest of reasons. 

With the Middle East and North Africa in turmoil the last thing needed is a conflict between superpowers in the Pacific.  Fortunately the Chinese showed commendable restraint.  Had they reacted in the same hot-headed manner as did the Turks we may not have survived the consequences long enough to see in the New Year.    

Beacon Batch and Black Down on the Mendip Hills in Somerset. Their link with the Bristol Blitz of 1940/41.

Beacon Batch on Black Down is, at 1068 feet, the highest point in the Mendip Hills. 

The most convenient place from which to approach Black Down is the car park adjacent to Burrington Ham on the B3134.  Cross the road, with care, and make your way left, then take the track to your right which goes past Ellick House and leads on to a gate which gives access to the northern slopes of Black Down.

I usually follow the diagonal path up towards Beacon Batch and the trig point.  This route is easier going but takes time: I find I am forever stopping to enjoy the magnificent view - carrying binoculars is recommended!

Black Down is crossed by a number of footpaths so an OS map is handy if you prefer walking and exploring rather than taking in the spectacular scenery.

Black Down viewed from Burrington Ham.

The link to the Bristol Blitz of 1940/41.

The first heavy raid on Bristol occurred on the night of 23rd/24th November 1940.  Subsequently, over the next six months, the city was frequently targeted by the Germans.

As part of Bristol's air defence system Black Down was chosen as a "Starfish" site: an area laid out with suitably lit fires and lighting to simulate a city under night bombing attack.  It was hoped that such sites would decoy Luftwaffe bomber crews away from their real target.  Those hopes were realised at the end of 1940 when the first bombs fell on Black Down and in the following January the site attracted over 1,000 incendiaries. The nearby Starfish sites at Chew Magna and Downside also proved successful.

My late mother described the site on Black Down in action as: " looking very pretty, just like twinkling fairy lights".  Twelve years old in 1940, she spent most of the next decade staying with relatives at Lye Hole and Redhill, just north of the Mendips, and with a fine view of Black Down.  She and my grandparents had the roof of their home in South Bristol badly damaged by a "near miss" early on in the Bristol Blitz.  It was fortunate that my grandmother came from a farming family with a spacious farmhouse in Lye Hole where safe refuge was at hand.


The view north from Black Down. Blagdon Lake is in the foreground with the village of Butcombe just beyond.  Bristol can be seen to the top left, most of the city is hidden by Dundry Hill.   

Saved by the Russians?

Between August 1940 and June 1941 Bristol was the fifth most heavily bombed city in Britain.  In late spring of 1941 the heaviest raids were over as the Luftwaffe's bomber groups began moving east in preparation for the German invasion of Russia.  From the autumn of 1941 the Germans faced determined and steadily mounting Russian resistance.  Under increasing pressure the Luftwaffe was never again able to gather enough bombers to mount air assaults on England of the same scale as 1940/41.